Cedarville University

DigitalCommons@Cedarville
Pamphlet Collection
1863

No Failure for the North
Francis Wayland Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/pamphlet_collection
This Pamphlet is brought to you for free and open access
by DigitalCommons@Cedarville, a service of the
Centennial Library. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Pamphlet Collection by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@Cedarville. For more information,
please contact digitalcommons@cedarville.edu.

LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY
S 63

BS BS O A B W A Y .
.To. II.

»

NO FAILURE
FOK

THE NOR T H
FLOM WE “ATLANTIC MONTHLY.”

NEW

YOItK. JIL¥,

1863.

NEW YORK:
Wm. C. Bryamt A: Co., Printers, 41 Nassau Street, cor. Liberty.

1 8G3.

9 75 78%
I 73?
76 -6?^ S5

LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY.

The objects of the Society are expressed in the following Resolu
tion, formally adopted by the unanimous vote of the Society,
at its first Meeting, 14 February, 1863.
Resolved, That the object of this organization is, and shall be confined to
the distribution of Journals and Documents of unquestionable and uncondi
tional loyalty throughout the United States, and particularly in the Armies

now engaged in the suppression of the Rebellion, and to counteract, as far as
practicable, the efforts now being made by the enemies of the Government

and the advocates of a disgraceful peace to circulate journals and documents
of a disloyal character.

Persons sympathising with the objects of this Society and wish
ing to contribute funds for its support, may address

MORRIS KETCHUM, Esq., Treasurer, 40 Exchange Place,
Receipts will be promptly returned.

LOYAL PUBLICATION SOCIETY,
SOS

IS R O A IS W A Y .
.Vo. 1 I.

NO FAILURE FOR THE NORTH.
From the '■’‘Atlantic ALontldy.”

We have reached a point in the history of our national
troubles where it seems desirable to examine our present posi
tion, and to consider whether we ought to surrender ourselves
to despair, or congratulate ourselves on decided success—
whether we should abandon all attempts to restore the Union,
assert the dignity of the Constitution, and punish treason, or
nerve ourselves to new effort, and determine to persevere in a
righteous cause so long as a single able-bodied man remains, or
a dollar of available property is unexpended.
It may be, it must be, conceded that we commenced the con
test with very crude and inadequate notions of what war really
is. We proposed to decide the issue by appealing to the census
and the tax-list—tribunals naturally enough occurring to a
mercantile and manufacturing community—but how if the
enemy prefer cannon and cold steel? Our first campaign was
in the field of statistics, and we found the results highly satis
factory. Our great numerical superiority, aided by our im
mense material resources, gave us an early and an easy victory.
We outnumbered the enemy everywhere, defeated them in
every pitched battle, starved them by a vigilant blockade, se
cured meanwhile the sympathy and support of the whole civilized
world by the holiness of our cause, and commanded its respect
by the display of our material power and our military capacity
—and in a few short months crushed the rebellion, restored the
Union, vindicated the Constitution, hung the arch-traitors, and
saw peace in all our borders. This was our campaign—on
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paper. But war is something more than a sum in arithmetic.
A campaign cannot be decided by the rule of three. No finite
power can control every contingency, and have all the chances
in its favor.
War means alternate success and defeat, alternate hope and
disappointment, great suffering in the field, many vacant chairs
at many firesides, immense expenditures with little apparent
result, “ the best-laid schemes foiled by a thousand unexpected
contingencies, lamentable indecision in the cabinet, glaring
blunders in the field, stagnation of industry, and heavy taxation.
“War is a game, which, were the nations wise,
Kings would not play at.”

But nations are not always wise, and war often becomes a
necessity. When, then, the necessity arises, it should be met
manfully. The question once deliberately decided that peace
is no longer consistent with national honor or national safety,
the dread alternative must be accepted With all its hazards and
all its horrors. To organize only in anticipation of certain and
speedy success, to despise and underrate the enemy, to inquire
with how small an army and how limited an expenditure the
war can be carried on, is as unstatesmanlike as it is in flat de
fiance of all historical teaching. But if we carry our folly still
farther in the same direction; if we fail to take into grave ac
count the most obvious and inevitable incidents of actual war
fare ; if in our overweening confidence we neglect discipline,
underrate the prime importance of promptness and decision in
action, certainty and celerity in movement, and energy and ac
tivity in pursuit; if, in a word, we expect that the defences of
the enemy are to fall into our hands by means as unwarlike as
those that decided the fate of Jericho, or dream that because
our cause is just every precedent in history, and every principle
in human nature will be overruled in our favor—then we de
serve to be outgeneralled, and are fortunate, if we escape
final and disastrous defeat.
Now, has not this been precisely our cardinal and capital
error, and are wre not to-day suffering its natural consequences ?
To the blind and unreasoning confidence with which we began
this war has succeeded a reaction running into the very opposite
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extreme. We &re given over to a despondency quite as un
warrantable as the extravagance of our early hopes. We de
manded and expected impossibilities. Forgetting that the age
of miracles has passed, many are now bitterly complaining that
nothing has been accomplished, and predicting that all future
efforts will terminate in similar failure. Two years have not
elapsed since the first gun was fired at Fort Sumter; and yet
we are amazed and mortified that our forces have not overrun
the whole South, that victory has not crowned our arms in
every battle, and that our flag does not float triumphant over
every acre of every State once called Confederate. Whether
this most desirable result could have been accomplished, if this
or that policy had been adopted at the outset, is one of those
problems that will never be solved ; nor is the inquiry at pres
ent pertinent or profitable. Let us rather ask whether, in view
of the means actually employed, our discontent with the exist
ing condition of affairs is not unmanly and unreasonable.
We are to measure results, not by the efforts that we ought
to have put forth, nor by those which we should put forth,
if, with our dear-bought experience, we were called upon
once more to undertake such a gigantic enterprise. We
must recall the aspect of affairs when we first embarked on this
perilous sea. We must remember how ignorant we were of all
the danger before us, how imperfect was the chart by which
our course was to be determined, how many shoals and sunken
rocks and cross-currents we were to encounter, as yet unknown
to any pilot on board our noble ship of state, how little we knew
of navigation in such angry waters, under sc stormy a sky.
Turn back the pages of history for two short years, and dwell
a moment on the picture presented to our eyes. A nation, en
joying to the utmost the substantial benefits belonging to fifty
y< ars of profound peace and unexampled prosperity, enervated
by those habits of luxury which wealth easily accumulated
always fosters, with a standing army hardly largo enough to
protect our Western frontier from the incursions of hostile In
dians, and a navy ludicrously small in proportion to the extent
of our sea-coast and the value of our commerce, is suddenly
pl tinged into a war covering such an extent of territory, and
calling fur such an array of power by sea and land as to dwarf
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into insignificance all modern wars, hardly excepting the mi!i
tary operations of Napoleon I.
And it must, be remembered that education and habit bad
trained us to an implicit reliance on the sufficiency of our laws
and the competency of our Constitution to meet and decide
every isgue that could possibly be presented. We could con
ceive of no public wrongs which could not be redressed by an
appeal to the ballot-box, and of no private injuries for which
our statutes did not provide a suitable remedy.
We were not only a law-abiding, but a peace-loving people.
The report of the revolver was not heard in our streets, nor was
the glitter of the bowie-knife seen in our bar-room. We dep
recated mob-violence, and disliked the summary proceedings
of Judge Lynch. We took no pains to conceal our horror of
unnecessary bloodshed, and shared the views of civilized Chris
tendom a^out duelling. We still clung to our plebeian pre- ■
judices against lawless violence, and persisted in believing that
a swaggering bully could not be an ornament to cultivated and
refined society. In fact, some excellent individuals at the
North went so far as to seek to disseminate these old-fashioned
notions among their Southern brethren, and made annual sub
scriptions to what was known (alas, that we must use the his
toric tense!) as the “Southern Aid Society,” having for its
praiseworthy object the support of ministers who should preach
the gospel to our ardent and impulsive neighbors. What a sad
atid significant commentary is it upon the ingratitude of de- .
praved human nature, that the condescending clergyman who
whilom consented to collect the offerings of these discriminating
philanthropists is now a chaplain in the Confederate army, and
is invoking the most signal judgments of Heaven upon his for
mer friends and fellow-laborers !
This, then, was our condition, and these were our habits, when
we were rudely awakened from our dreams of peace by the roar
of cannon and the clash of arms. What wonder that the startling
summons found us all unready for such a crisis ? What wonder
that our early preparations to confront the issue thus forced upon
us without note of warning were hasty, incomplete, and quite
inadequate to the emergency ? Is it discreditable to us that
we were slow to appreciate the bitterness and intensity of
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that hatred, which, long smouldering under the surface of
Sout^rn society, burst forth at once into a wide spread confla
gration, severing like flax all the ties of kindred, and all the
bonds of individual friendship and national intercourse which
had united us for half a century ? Here was a section of our
Union which had always enjoyed equal rights with us under the
Constitution, and had known the Government only by its bless
ings,—nay, more, had actually, by the confession of its own
statesmen, controlled the internal administration and dictated
the foreign policy of the country since the adoption of the Con
stitution ; which had no substantial grievance to complain of,
and no fanciful injury which could not be readily redressed by
legal and constitutional methods. Are we to be blamed because
we could not easily bring ourselves to believe that an integral
part of our nation, with such a history, could, under a pretence
so bald as to insult the common sense of Christendom, rush head
long into a war which must close all its avenues of commerce,
paralyze all its industry, threaten the existence of its cherished
and peculiar institution,—in a word, whether successful or un
successful, inevitably result in its political suicide? At this
very moment, accustomed as we have been for many sad and
weary months to the daily development of Southern folly and
madness, it is difficult, when we withdraw our minds from the
present, to realize that the whole war is not a hideous night
mare.
In view of all this, I ask, is it strange that we did not at once
comprehend all our danger, and did not enter the field with all
our forces,—determined to fight with desperate energy until
every trace of rebellion was crushed out? If, disturbed at
midnight by footsteps in your chamber, you start up from sound
slumber to see a truculent-looking vagabond prowling about
your room with a lighted candle, do you not at once spring to
your feet, collar the intruder, and shout lustily for help, if he
prove too strong for you ? Prompt and vigorovs action in such
a case is simply the impulse of instinct. But how if you recog
nize in the untimely visitor a member of your own household ?
A\' ill you seize and overpower him without asking a single ques
tion, or waiting for a word of explanation ? AVill you not pause
lor some overt act of hostility, some convincing proof of a fell
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purpose? Suppose it transpire that he really means mischief,
and you lose an important advantage by your delay to strike.
You may regret the result; but does it in the least tend to^how
that you were cowardly or careless? Now, was not this our
txact dilemma ? Although the orgin of the war and the cir
cumstances attendant upon its commencement are a thricetold tale, are we not in danger of overlooking their bearing
upon all’our subsequent action? And shall we not act wisely,
if we recur to them again and again, during this momentous
contest ?
But, asks a timid Conservative,—from whose patient button the
fingers of an ardent apostle of peace have recently and most re
luctantly parted,'—has not this war been shamefully mismanaged
by the Administration? have not contractors grown rich while
soldiers have suffered ? have not incompetent generals been
unjustly advanced, and skillful commanders been summarily
shelved? have we gained any advantages at all commensurate
with our loss of blood and our expenditure of money ? would
not a cessation of hostilities on any terms be better than such a
war as we are now waging? If we might venture to suggest a
word of caution to our desponding friend, before attempting a
reply to his broadside of questions, we would say : Beware how
you indulge in too much conversation with a certain class of
our citizens, whose hearty loyalty has been more than doubted,
and whose conversion to the beauties of peace and the horrors
of war is so sudden as to be very suspicious. Examine their
antecedents, and you will find, that, when “ border ruffians” in
Kansas threatened with fire and sword the inoffensive emigrants
from New England, these gentlemen saw nothing unusual in
such proceedings, and answered all remonstrances with ridicule.
Put them to the question to-day, and it will appear, that, from
the very beginning of the struggle, all their sympathies have
been with the South. They will tell you that Northern Aboli
tionists are alone responsible for the war ; that the secession of
the Southern States may have been unwise, but was not unrea
sonable ; that they have always condemned coercion and advo
cated compromise; and that there is no safe and satisfactory
way out of our existing difficulties but—peace. What do they
mean by peace ? Such peace as the highwayman, armed to the

teeth, offers to the belated traveller ! Such peace as Benedict
Arnold sought to negotiate with the English general ! They
know that the South will accept no terms but the acknowledg
ment of her independence, or the abject and unconditional sub
mission of the Free States. They reject the first alternative,
because they dare not go before the North on such an issue.
Disguise it as they may, they are willing to adopt the second.
The party to which, without an exception, these men belong,
is powerless without the co-operation of the South, and would
consider no sacrifice of principle too great, and no humiliation
of the North too degrading, if it promised the restoration of
their political supremacy. Avoid all such men. Distrust their
advice. That way dishonor lies, and national disgrace. If you
are not “ armed so strong in honesty ” as to be proof against
such treasonable talk, you will soon be aware of a softening of
your backbone, and a lamentable loss of earnest, active patriot
ism. Take counsel rather of your own common sense. Look
ing at the question in its narrowest and most selfish bearings,
you know that we can neither recede nor stand still. Submis
sion is slavery. Disunion paves the way for endless secession,
and eternal warfare between rising and rival republics.
But there are other symptoms of disloyalty besides this per
sistent demand for peace. There are indications of a desire to
array sections of the North against each other, and—Heaven
save the mark !—by the very politicians who have been most
bitter in their denunciation of “ geographical parties.” Here
comes a little Western lawyer, with unlimited resources of slang
and slender capital of ideas, barely redeemed from being an
absolute blackguard by the humanizing influences of a New
England college, but showing fewer and fewer symptoms of
civilization as he forgets the lessons of his collegiate life ; and
Ice delights an audience of New York “roughs” by the novel
information, that “ Puritanism is a reptile ” and the cause of
all our troubles, and that wo shall never fulfil.our national des
tiny until Puritanism has been crushed. Let us not elevate
this nauseating nonsense into importance by attempting a reply.
Such men must be left to follow out their inevitable instincts.
They are not worth the trouble necessary to civilize them. Mr.
Rarey
succeeded in taming a zebra from the London Zoological
JO
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Gardens; but a single lesion could not permanentlyreclaim the
beast, and it soon relapsed into its native and normal ferocity.
One experiment sufficed to show the power of the artist; no
possible increase of value in the educated animal would have
justified a prolonged and perfect training.
You ask if we have gained any advantages commensurate
with our efforts, or with the high-sounding phrase of our de
clared purpose. Let us look at this a moment. Suppose we
begin with a glance at the other side of the picture. Has all
the boasting, have all the promises, been on the Federal side?
Did we hear nothing of the Confederate flag floating over
Faneuil Hall ?—nothing of Washington falling into the hands
of the enemy?—nothing of a festive winter in Philadelphia,
and a general distribution of spoils in New York ?—nothing of
foreign intervention ?—'nothing of the cowardice of Northern
Mudsills, and the omnipotence of King Cotton ? Decidedly,
the rebels began with a sufficiently startling programme. Let
us see how far they have carried it out. As they were clearly
the assailants, we have an undoubted right to ask what they
have accomplished aggressively. We say, then, that, excepting
in the case of one brief raid, the soil of a single Free State has
never been polluted by the hostile tread of an invading force;
that every battle-field has been within the limits of States
claimed as Confederate ; that while the war has desolated whole
States represented in the Confederate Congress, not an acre
north of Mason and Dixon’s line has suffered from the ravages
of the rebel armies. Was ever another scorpion more com
pletely surrounded and shut in by a cordon of fire ?
This is surely something, but it is by no means all. Have we
accomplished nothing aggressively? We will call into court a
witness from the enemy’s camp. Hear the recent testimony of
a leading journal, published ift the Confederate capital:
*
“It is not altogether an empty boast on the part of the
Yankees, that thSy hold all that they have ever held, and that
another year or two of such progress as they have already made
will find them master's of the Southern Confederacy. They
who think independence is to achieved by brilliant but
inconsequential victories, would do well to look at the magni
* Richmond Examiner, January 20th, 1863.
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tude of Yankee possessions in our country. Maryland, Ken
tucky, and Missouri are claimed as constituent parts of the
Confederation : they are as much in the power of Lincoln as
Maine and Minnesota. The pledge once deemed foolish by the
South, that he would ‘ hold, occupy, and possess’ all the forts
belonging to the United States Government, lias been redeemed
almost to the letter by Lincoln. Forts Pickens [Sumter?] and
Morgan we still retain ; but with these exceptions, all the strong
holds on the seaboard, from Fortress Monroe to the Rio Grande,
are in the hands of the enemy. Very consoling and very easy
to say that it was impossible to prevent all this, and that the
occupation of the outer edge of the Republic amounts to
nothing. Drury’s Bluff and Vicksburg give the lie to the first.
assertion ; and the onward movement of Rosecrans towards
Alabama, the presence of Grant in North Mississippi and of
Curtis in Middle Arkansas, to say nothing of Banks at New
Orleans and Baton Rouge, set at rest the silly dream that
a thin strip of sea-coast only is in possession of our foes. The
truth is, the Yankees are in great force in the very heart of the
Confederacy ; they swarm on all our borders ; they threaten
every important city yet belonging to us ; and nearly two hun
dred thousand of them are within two days’ march of the Con
federate capital. This is no fiction. It is a fact so positive
that no one can deny it.”
But this reluctant recital by no means exhausts the record of
our success. We have put into the field a volunteer force,
fully armed and equipped, which, whether we consider its
magnitude, the rapidity with which it has been raised, its
fighting qualities, its patient endurance of unaccustomed hard
ships, or its intelligent appreciation of the principles involved
in the contest, is without a counterpart in history. And yet
more, from the invention and achievements of our iron clads
dates a new era in naval warfare, while in the value and variety
of our ordnance we have taken the lead of all civilized nations.
Can you find in all this nothing to quicken the pulse of your
patriotism ? Is here no ground for encouragement, no incite
ment to renewed effort ?
But you complain of corruption among contractors, and
of knavery among politicians. Will you point me to a single
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war, ever waged on the face of the earth, where all the rulers
were above reproach and all their subordinates unselfish ? But
what will you do about it? Grant that many contractors have
made dishonest fortunes out of the calamities of their country,
and that there are office-holders with whom “ Stand by the Con
stitution ?” means, Stand by the public crib from which we are
richly and regularly fed, and “Uphold the Administration I”
should be translated, Give us our full four years’ enjoyment of
the loaves and fishes. What then ? Shall a few worthless straws
here, and a few heaps of offal there, arrest or check the onward
march of a mighty army, the steady progression of a great princi
ple? Away with such trumpery considerations I Punish with
the utmost severity of the law every public plunderer whose
* crimes can be dragged into the light of day ; send to the
Coventry of universal contempt every lagging and lukewarm
official; but, in the name of all that is holy in purpose and
noble in action, move pn ! To hesitate is worse than folly ; to
delay is more than madness. The salvation of our country
trembles in the balance. The fate of free institutions for—
who shall say how long?—may hang upon the issue of the
struggle.
Your catalogue of grievances, however, is still incomplete.
You are dissatisfied with our generalship as displayed in the
field, and with the wisdom of our policy as developed by the
cabinet. Unquestionably you have a constitutional right to
grumble to your heart’s content; but are you not aware that
such complaints are as old as the history of the human race ?
Do you believe this to be the first war that was ever mis
managed, and that our undoubted blunders are either novel or
peculiar to Republics? There never was a greater mistake. If
there were brave men before Agamemnon, and wise counsellors
before Ulysses, there certainly have been incompetent com
manders before Mager-General A., and shallow statesmen
before Secretary B. We do not monopolize executive imbe
cility,nor are our military blunders without parallel or precedent.
To attribute our occasional reverses, and our indecisive victories,
our inaction in the field and our confusion in the cabinet, to our
peculiar form of government, is as inconsequential as it would
be to trace all our disasters to the color of President Lincoln’s
hair or the number of General Halleck’s children.
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Ihe enemies of free institutions, hardly yet recovered from
their astonishment at beholding an army of volunteers, superior
in number and quality to any the world ever saw, spring into
existence with such marvellous rapidity as to eclipse, in sober
fact, the fabulous birth of Minerva full-armed from the head
of Jove, or their still greater surprise at seeing the immense
expenses of so gigantic a war readily met without assistance
from abroad, by large loans cheerfully made and heavy taxation
patiently borne, are reduced to the necessity of exulting over
■what they term our “ total want of military genius,” and our
“incapacity to conduct a campaign successfully.”
It is useless to deny that we may have challenged criticism
and provoked a smile by our large promise and our smaller
performance. But are we the sole and exclusive proprietors of
this experience ? Where in the past or the present shall we
find a great and powerful nation much addicted to modesty or
self-depreciation? Least of all, should we have expected such
venomous criticism and such unsparing ridicule from England.
To be sure, we have long since ceased to look for sympathy or
even justice at her hands. We have come to understand and
appreciate the tone and temper of her ruling classes towards
this country. In addition to their inherited antipathy to Re
publics, they believe in sober earnest what one of their greatest
wits said jocosely, that “ the great object for which the AngloSaxon race appears to have been created is the making of calico.”
And whatever interferes, or threatens to interfere, with this enno
bling occupation is sure to incur their passive displeasure, if not
their active hostility. We expect nothing, therefore, from their
good-will; but we have a right to demand, as a matter of good
taste, that, in criticizing our campaigns, they shall not wholly
ignore their own military blunders, especially those so recent
as to be fresh in the recollection of every third-form school-boy
in the kingdom. For, if campaigns carried on with the smallest
possible result in proportion to the magnitude of the sacrifice
of money and life—if a succession of incompetent generals in
command—if critical military opportunities neglected and
enormous stragetic blunders committed—if indecision, nepot
ism, and red tape at home, envy, want of unity, and incapacity
among officers, and unnecessary and inexcusable hardship
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among the privates—if all this declares the decadence of a
Government, then was the sun of England hastening to its set
ting during the Crimean War.
We hear much said abroad about our indecisive battles, our
barren victories, our failure to take advantage of the crippled
condition of a defeated enemy, and our unaccountable disinclina
tion to follow up a successful attack by a prompt pursuit. Now,
not for the sake of excusing or palliating the numerous and
grave errors into which we have fallen during our own unhappy
struggle, nor yet to exonerate from censure any civil officers
or military leaders who may be wholly or in part responsible
for these errors, but simply to demonstrate that they are liable
to occur under any form of government, and, indeed, have re
cently befallen the very government whose rulers now hold us
to the strictest account, and are most eager to convict us of ex
traordinary misconduct and incapacity, We propose, very briefly
and without further introduction, to examine the record of the
English army during the Crimean War.
The first important battle fought on the Peninsula was that
of the-Alma. We will give, as consisely as possible, so much
of the history of this engagement, compiled from authentic
English sources, as will present a correct picture of the plans
formed and the results accomplished.
“ The 15th of August, 1854, was the first date fixed for the sail
ing of the allied forces from Varna to the Crimea. It was post
poned until the 20th, then till the 22d, then the 26th—then
successively to the 1st, 2d, and 7th of September; that is, the
French fleet left Varna on the 5th, and the English sailed from
the neighboring port of Baltschick on the 7th.” It is admitted
that “ these delays hazarded not only the success, but even the
practicability of the whole design, as between the 15th and 25th
of September the great equinoctial gales sweep over the Black
Sea, and lash into tempests of the most destructive nature.”*
The voyage, however, was accomplished in safety, and on the
14th of September the Allies arrived at the Crimea, off’ a place
called the “ Old Fort,” only about thirty miles north of Sabastopol. The whole army was composed of 27,000 English,
24,000 French, and 8,000 Turks. The landing occupied the
14th, 15th, and IGth of September. At nine o’clock A. M.,
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of September 19th, the army began the advance, andon the
evening of the same day rested for the night within sight of the
Russian forces, strongly intrenched on the banks of the Alma,
about twelve miles distant from the “ Old Fort.” Early in the
afternoon of the following day the Allies attacked the strong
hold of the enemy, and in less than three hours the Russian intrenchments were successfully stormed, and the Russian army
was in full retreat. The English and French troops fought with
determined and distinguished bravery, and their victory was
complete. But what was decided by this bloody struggle?
Bad generalship on the part of the Russians, certainly ; but
what else ? Mr. Russell says,—“This great battle was not de
cisive, so far as the fate of Sebastopol was concerned, merely
because we lacked either the means or the military genious to
make it so.” The victory was not followed up, the retreating
foe were not pursued, ample time was given to the enemy to
reorganize and retrieve their losses, and the evening of the event
ful 20th September found the allied forces no nearer the cap
ture of Sebastopol than they were before the battle.
Did “ the Alma ” crown the allied generals with fresh and
well-earned laurels? We appeal once more to Mr. Russell:
“I may inquire, Was there any generalship shown by any of
the allied generals at the Alma? We have Lord Raglan painted
by one of his staff, trotting in front of his army, amid a shower
of balls, ‘just as if he were riding down Rotten Row,’ with, a
kind nod for every one, and leaving his generals to fight it out
as the best they could ; riding across the stream through the
French Riflemen, not knowing where he was going to, or where
the enemy were, till fate led him to a little knoll, from which
he saw some of the Russian guns on his flank ; whereupon he
sent an order to Turner’s battery for guns, and seemed surprised
th^t they could not be dragged across a stream and up a hill
which presented some difficulties to an unencumbered horse
man ; then cantering off to join the Guards just ere they made
their charge, and finding it all over while he was in a hollow of
the ground.” Lord Raglan, let it be remembered, was the
Commander-in-Chief of the English forces. And again : “ The
Light Division was strangely handled. Sir George Brown,
whose sight was so indifferent that he had to get one of his offi
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cers to lead his horse across the river, seemed not to know where
his division was.............If the conduct of a campaign be a suc
cession of errors, the Crimean expedition was certainly carried
on secundum artem.” Once more, on the same point, and
quoting from the same authority : “ xA.ll the Russian officers
with whom I have conversed, all the testimony I have heard
or read, coincide on these two points: first, that, if, on the
25th, we had moved to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians,
we should have found their army in a state of the most com
plete demoralization, and might have forced the great majority
of them to surrender as prisoners of war, in a sort of cul-de-sac,
from which but few could have escaped ; secondly, that, had
we advanced directly against Sebastopol, the town would have
surrendered, after some slight show of resistence to save the
honor of the officers.” Certainly, such generalship as this did
not promise very well for the results of the campaign.
Let us follow’ the movements of the Allies a little farther.
On the morning of September 25th, the combined forces took
up their line of march southward. On the 26th, they reached
and occupied the town of Balaklava, about six miles distant
from Sebastopol. On the 28th of the same month, Lord Raglan
wrote to the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of War, “ We
are busily engaged in disembarking our siege-train and pro
visions, and we are most desirous of undertaking the attack of
Sebastopol without the loss of a day” And yet it is not until
October 10th, that the Allies commence digging their trenches
before the town. Mean while the allied army was anxious and
impatient. “ ‘ When will the siege commence ?? was the con
stant inquiry of the wearied and expectant troops. ‘To-mor
row,’ was the usual response, ‘ most probably to-morrow.’ But
day after day came and went, and the Allies still rusted in inac
tion, while the Russians worked day and night at strengthening
their defences.” “The time dragged heavily on ; still the Rus
sians worked with incredible industry, and still the cannon of
the Allies had not yet opened their thunders upon Sebastopol.”
On the 17th of October, twenty-one days after the occupation
of Balaklava, the allied forces commenced fire by land and sea
on the stronghold of the enemy. The bombardment continued
from half-past six A. AL, until nightfall, but is conceded to
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have been a complete and mortifying failure. From this time
until the 5th of November, it will not be contended that any
substantial advantage was g^ned by the invading forces, or
that material progress was made towards the reduction of the
Russian Gibraltar.
Then came the battle of Inkerman, a gallant and desperate
sortie, of the Russians, bravely and successfully resisted by the
besiegers. The loss of life on both sides was terrible. To what
extent was this battle decisive ? Mr. Russell shall give his own
testimony on this point: “ We had nothing to rejoice over, and
almost everything to deplore, in the battle of Inkerman. We
defeated the enemy, indeed, but bad not advanced one step
nearer the citadel of Sebastopol.” In other words, the Allies
had repulsed the Russians, but bad barely escaped annihilation,
while, from having been the besiegers, they became the beeieged, and remained so until largely reinforced from home.
“ A heavy responsibility,” says Mr. Russell, “ rests on those
whose neglect enabled the enemy to attack us where we were
least prepared for it, and whose indifference led them to despise
precautions which, taken in time, might have saved us many
valuable lives, and have trebled the loss of the enemy.” The
English not only committed the serious .error of underrating the
enemy, and neglecting the most ordinary precautions against
surprise, but, during the whole of the desperate and bloody
fight, they gave no proof whatever of generalship. The stub
born, unyielding bravery of the troops was the salvation of
the army. “ We owed the victory, such as it was, to strength,
not to superior intelligence and foresight. It was a soldiers’
battle, in which we were saved by the muscle, nerve, and cour
age of our men.” Humanity shudders and the heart sickens
over the sufferings of that gallant army of martyrs to Cabinet
incapacity and military imbecility during the long and dreary
winter of 1854-55.
On the 9th of April, 1855, commenced the second grand
bombardment of Sebastopol, which, though continuing for
twelve days, resulted, like the first, in mortifying failure, no se
rious or irreparable injuries being caused to the main defences
of the enemy. “ The real strength of the place remained un
impaired. That which was injured during the day the Russians
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repaired as if by magic during the night. The particulars of
this twelve days’ bombardment are wearisome. The same
wasted energy, the same night skirmishes without effect, the
same battering and repairing, th& same unwearied exertions on
the part of the Allies and wonderful endurance and resistance
on the part of the Russians, together with, on each side, the
same loss of life and frightful mutilations.”
Two months were passed in comparative inaction, the sad
monotony being varied only by ineffective sorties and indecisive
skirmishes. On the 18th of June the first grand assault of the
Malakoff and Redan was attempted. The allied troops dis
played the utmost gallantry, and did all that brave men could
do under disgracefully incompetent commanders, but were re
pulsed with horrible slaughter. No one can read the details of
the fruitless massacre, without fully confirming the indignant
testimony of an intelligent eye-witness, writing from the camp:
“ I know not what may have been the feelings of your home
public, on reading the telegraphic news of our defeat, (for I
presume the scribes at headquarters made no attempt to conceal
the naked truth, that our repulse was neither more or less than
a defeat,) but here mingled shame and indignation were general
throughout the camp. Officers and men alike felt that dis
grace had been incurred, and that solely in consequence of the
unredeemed mismanagement of their generals. Remembering
the confusion which characterized the commencement of our
movement, and coupling this with the murderous preparations
made by the enemy, you will be at no loss to understand that
success was most improbable. During the whole affair, Lord
Raglan and Sir George Brown were ensconced within our eightgun battery ; but, though this afforded a good view of the scene
of the struggle, and of the disorder which marked it, they ap
peared to be unable to give any efficient directions for the cor
rection of our multipled blunders. When the whole sad scene
was ended, our men straggled back to the camp in a state of
dispirited confusion, well in keeping with the mob-like disorder
in which they had been throughout the assault.”
The final bombardment of Sebastopol took place on
the 5th of September, followed on the Sth by the renewed
assault of the French on the Malakoff and of the Eng
lish on the Redan. Skillful generalship, adequate forces,
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and desperate bravery gave victory to the French, and “ the
key to Sebastopol” remained in their hands. Meanwhile the
English assault upon the Redan was repulsed with frightful
sacrifice of life. It will not be contended that the French owed
any part of their success to superior good fortune. Indeed, all
the extrinsic advantages were on the side of the English. The
French were to lead off in the assault, and the tri-color waving
over the captured fortification was to be the signal for the ad
vance of the English. If the French succeeded, every senti
ment of personal ambition and national pride would stimulate
their allies to achieve an equal victory. If the French failed,
the English had only to remain in their trenches.
Now let us examine the comparative generalship displayed
in the two assaults. We are quite willing that English author
ity should draw the contrast. “ The preparations of the French
were actually scientific in their vigorous attention to every mat
ter calculated to lead to victory; nothing appeared to have
been forgotten, nothing neglected. Even the watches of the
leading officers had been regulated, that there might not be the
smallest error with regard to time. It is a painful reflection
that this carefulness of preparation, and prescience with respect
to probabilities, was not shown by the English general and his
associates in arranging the mode of attack. When the orders
were promulgated, on the 7th, many officers shook their heads
doubtingly, and observed, in deprecating tones, ‘ This looks
like another 18th of June.’ It was generally observed that the
attacking columns were not strong enough, that they were too
far behind, and that the trenches did not afford room for a suf
ficient number of men.”
The signal for the French assault was given ; thirty thousand
men, weary of long inactivity, and burning to add new lustre
to the bright record of their country’s military glory—drums
and trumpets meanwhile sounding the charge, and the air re
sounding with shouts of “ Vive VEmp&reur”—darted from
their trenches, swarmed up the embankments, dashed over the
parapet, swept the enemy like chaff before them, and the Mal
akoff was won. Hours of the fiercest fighting found the
French still masters of the situation ; at nightfall the Russian
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general sullenly drew off his defeated forces, and the victory
was complete.
It is painful to turn from this brilliant picture to the sombre
coloring and the dreary details of the attack, on the Redan. To
three thousand doomed men was assigned the perilous under
taking. Incredible as it may appear, in view of previous
failure, there seems to have been no adequate preparation, no
intelligible plan, no competent leader. It was simply brute
force assailing brute force. The few men who actually entered
the Redan neglected to spike the guns; no reinforcements came
to their aid; everything was blind excitement, and headlong,
undisciplined haste. “ The men of the different regiments be
came mingled together in inextricable confusion. The Nine
teenth men did not care for the officers of the Eighty-eighth,
nor did the soldiers of the. Twenty-third heed the command of
an officer who did not belong to their regiment. The officers
could not find their men—the men lost sight of their officers.”
But why dwell on what soon became mere butchery ? The
loss of the storming party, in killed, wounded, and missing, was
2,447 !
Considered as a military movement, it would seem to be con
ceded that no grosser blunder could have been made than the
selection of so small a force for so desperate an undertaking.
There was no chance of success but by attacking simultaneously
both flanks and the salient of the Redan. The storming party
was barely large enough for the assault of the salient, thus ex
posing the handful of men to a murderous and fatally destruct
ive fire from the flanks. This was bad enough, certainly, but
worse remains behind. English critics have most severely cen
sured our generals for sometimes placing new recruits in posts
of danger, requiring cool heads, steady nerves, and the habits
of discipline. Perhaps they have forgotten the following inci
dent. Among the picked men selected out of the entire British
forces as this very storming party, were raw recruits from the
Ninety-seventh regiment, who were designated for this perilous
service as a punishment for their cowardice in a recent skirmish !
—and to make this punishment still more severe, they were order
ed to lead off in the assault! An historian of the war says : “ The
inexperience of some of these recruits seems almost incredible,
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One young fellow, who came to the field-hospital with a broken
arm and a bullet in his shoulder, carried his firelock with him,
but confessed that he had never fired it off, as he was unable to
do so. The piece, upon being examined, was found to be in
perfect order. Such poor, undisciplined lads, fresh from the
plough, ought never on any occasion to have been pitted against
the well-drilled soldiers of Russia; but it was something worse
than blundering to lead them on to the assault of a formidable
work like the Redan. Such generalship recalls to our mind the
remark of the Russian officer with regard to the military force
of England, that ‘ it was an army of lions led by donkeys.’ ”
Mr. Russell states that many of these recruits “ had only been
enlisted a few days, and had never fired a rifle in their lives.”
Now, will it be believed that General Codrington, to whom
was committed the planning and directing of this ill-starred
and disastrous enterprise, succeeded Sir James Simpson as
commander-in-chief of Her Majesty’s forces in the Crimea?
How must the shade of Admiral Byng have haunted Her
Majesty’s Government, unless it was a most forgiving ghost!
If General Codrington’s promotion could have been delayed a
little more than eighteen months, it might have occurred appro
priately on the centennial anniversary of the death of that illfated naval commander, convicted by court-martial and shot for
“ not doing his utmost I”
On the evening of the Sth of September, the Russians blew
up their magazines, fired the buildings, and evacuated the town.
So fell Sebastopol, after a siege of three hundred and forty-five
days. It has been considered by the English a bit of very
choice pleasantry to allude to our oft-recurring statement, that
“ the decisive blow had been struck,” and that “ the backbone
of the Rebellion was broken.” It may not be impertinent to
remind them, that the report, first circulated in Franco and
England in the latter part of September, 1854, and fortified by
minute details, that Sebastopol—the backbone of Russian re
sistance to the allied arms—had fallen, was repeated and reiter
ated from time to time during the war, until the phrase, “Sebas
topol est pr ls^ passed into a by-word, and did good service in
relieving the cruelly overworked Greek Kalends.
Ami now we come naturally to the consideration of another
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and an important inquiry. Did the beginning of the war find,
or did its progress develop or create, a single English general
of'commanding military capacity, competent to handle in the
field even so small an army as the British contingent in the
Crimea? Of Lord Raglan Mr. Russell says, and without doubt
says truly : “ That he was a great chief, or even a moderately
able general, I have every reason to doubt, and I look in vain
for any proof of it, whilst he commanded the English army in
the Crimea.” Another authority says: “The conviction that
he was not a great general is universal and uncontradicted.
He could perform the ordinary duties of a general satisfactorily,
but he was lamentably deficient in those qualities ■which consti
tute military genius. He possessed considerable professional
experience, great application, and remarkable powers of en
durance ; but he lacked the energy, vehemence, and decision of
character which are essential to the constitution of a successful
military chieftain.” To his hesitation in council, and his want
of energy and promptness in action, have always been attrib
uted, in large measure, the ruinous delays and the fearful suf
fering in the army which he. commanded. Lord Raglan died
in June, 1855, in his sixty-seventh year. General Simpson
succeeded him. “ It was believed at the time,” writes Mr.
Russell, “ and now is almost notorious, that he opposed his own
appointment, and bore testimony to his own incapacity.” “ He
was slow and cautious in council, and it is no wonder that
where Lord Raglan failed, General Simpson did not meet with
success.” The English press and people demanded his recall.
Uis incompetency was everywhere acknowledged, and indeed
he himself would have been the last man to deny it. In about
three months from the date of General Simpson’s appointment,
“ the Queen was graciously pleased to permit him to resign the
command of the army.” As fre have already seen, his place
was filled by General Codrington. This officer was as signally
rewarded, because he had failed, as he could have been, if he
had succeeded. Mr. Russell quotes approvingly the comment
of a French officer upon this appointment: “ If General Cod
rington had taken the Redan, what more could you have done
for him than to make him General, apd to give him command
of the army ? But he did not take it, and he is made General
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and Commander-in-Chief.” With equal discrimination, Sir
James Simpson was created Field-Marshal! The remainder of
the campaign gave General Codrington no further opportunity
of displaying his qualities for command. No other important
action occurred before the termination of hostilities.
Great credit is certainly due to Mr. Russell for fearlessly ex
posing the errors and incompetency of the three officers suc
cessively at the head of the English army, in spite of “ much
obloquy, vituperation, and injustice,” and for bearing his
invariable and eloquent testimony to the bravery, endurance,
and patience of the British private soldier.
In this brief recital of English blunders during the Crimean
war, we have made no mention of the desperate and disastrous
“ charge of the light brigade,” the gross and culpable inef
ficiency of the Baltic fleet under Admiral Sir Charles Napier,
and other instances of military incapacity no less monstrous.
Enough, however, has been told to more than justify the very
mild summing-up of Mr. Russell, that the “ war had exposed
the weakness of our military organization in the grave emer
gencies of a winter campaign, and the canker qf a long peace
was unmistakably manifested in our desolated camps and deci
mated battalions.”
Why should we add to this dismal recital the appalling suf
fering of the soldiers—helpless victims to bad management at
home and shameful neglect in the field—-the long, freezing
nights of trench-work under a driving rain, “ without ^arm or
water-proof clothing—the trenches two and three feet deep with
mud, snow, and half-frozen slush, so that many, when they took
off their shoes, were unable to get their swollen feet into them
again, and might be seen barefooted about the camp, the snow
half a foot deep on the ground,” creeping for shelter into
“ miserable tents pitched as it were at the bottom of a marsh,
where twelve or fourteen unhappy creatures lay soaking with
out change of clothing,” until they were called out again to
their worse than slave labor—disease, brought on by exhaustion,
exposure, overwork, and deficient food, sweeping the men off"
by thousands, and yet no sufficient supply of medical stores and
no adequate number ot medical attendants, not a soul seeming
to cure tor their comfort or even for their lives—so neglected
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and ill-treated that 11 the wretched beggar who wandered about
the streets of London led the life of a prince compared with the
British soldiers who were fighting for their country, and who
were complacently assured by the home authorities that they
were the best-appointed army in Europe.” - The world knows
the whole sad story by heart. And is it not written in the
volumes of evidence sworn to before the Commission appointed
by Parliament to inquire into the condition of the army?
Nor is it necessary to dwell upon the extent to which the
home administration was responsible for the general misman
agement of the war, in its main features, and its minute
details, nor the thoroughly English stolidity with which all ceraplaints were received by every member of the Government,
from the cabinet minister who dictated pompous and unmeaning
despatches, down to the meanest official who measured red tape,
nor the intense and universal popular indignation which, after
a year “ full of horrors,” compelled the resignation of the Ab
erdeen Ministry. Lord Derby did not, perhaps, overstate the
verdict of the nation, when he said in the House of Lords :
“ From the very first to the very last, there has been apparent
in the course pursued by Her Majesty’s Government a want of
previous preparation, a total want of prescience; and they
have appeared to live from day to day providing for each suc
cessive exigency after it arose, and not before it arose. Too
late have been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct
of Her Majesty’s Government in the course of the war.” The
change in the ministry, however, by no means cured all the
evils which had existed ; for, although the sufferings of the
soldiers—thanks in large part to the providential appearance
and heroic conduct of Florence Nightingale—were greatly di
minished, still, as we have seen, the military blunders con
tinued to the close of the war.
Now, if we do not greatly mistake, the les?on which this
ebuntry should learn from the mortifying experience of the
English army in the Crimea is not one of exultation over
its lamentable and unnecessary errors, but rather of indifference
to the insulting criticism of a nation which can so ill afford to
be critical, and of determination to profit in every possible way
by those blunders which might have been avoided. The his
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tory of all wars, moreover, should teach us that now and then
there comes a time when to hold the olive-branch in one hand
and the sword in the other, especially if the olive-branch is kept
in the foreground and the sword in the background, involves
not only a sad waste of energy, but is mistaken kindness to our
enemies.
Use every weapon which the God of Battles has placed in
our hands. Put forth all the power of the nation. Encourage
and promote all fighting generals ; cashier all officers who are
determined to make war on peace principles ; arm, equip, and
discipline negroes, not to burn, plunder, and massacre, but to
meet their and our enemies in fair and open fight.
*
Demon
strate to the world that we are terribly in earnest. Waste no
time in discussing the chance of foreign intervention. Postpone
polygamy in Utah, African colonization, everything, to the
engrossing and emergent crisis which now confronts the Gov
ernment. Make the contest sharp, short and decisive. Put
down the Rebellion, vindicate the majesty of the Law, the
sacredness of the Union, and the integrity of the Constitutiorf.
There will be time enough, after this is done, to discuss all minor
questions and all collateral issues. One paramount duty lies
directly before us. Let us'perform this duty fearlessly, and
leave the future with God.

* The opposition to the employment of negro regiments, if made by traitors
North or South, can be easily comprehended ; if made by loyal men, is wholly
inexplicable. Your neighbor’s house takes fire at night. The flames, long smouL
di ring, make rapid progress, and threaten the comfort, certainly, if not the lives of
the household, and the total destruction of his property. The alarm is given. An
engine comes promptly to the rescue. It is just in season to save his dwelling.
I he firemen spring with ready alacrity to their places. But stop ! He suddenly
di-corers the appalling fact that they are negroes! True, there is not a moment to
be lost. No other engine is, or can be, within helping distance. The least delay
means poverty and a houseless family. And yet he rudely dismisses the dusky
re men, folds his arm with Spartan stoicism, and, looking complacently on the
burning building, says : “ Better this than to rely on the assistance of niggers !’>
Is it Spaitan stoicism t Is it not rather stark lunacy ? And would you not take
immediate measures to provide such a man with permanent quarters in a mad
house i
.
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